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Abstract 
When individuals estimate the price of goods or services, irrelevant factors may affect the 
estimates. For example, irrelevant numbers in individuals’ environments can cause participants 
to “anchor” to them as starting point price estimates, such that estimates tend toward the anchor 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Chapman & Johnson, 1994).  In fact, anchored individuals may 
pay up to three times as much for a product and buy 32% more products (Ariely, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2003; Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998). Because anchoring affects purchases large and 
small, this study investigates how to debias, or reduce the negative effects of, the anchoring 
heuristic. Debiasing strategies are not easily implemented outside the lab where anchoring has 
the largest real world effects (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Chapman & Johnson, 1994; George, 
Duffy, & Ahuja, 2000). We therefore investigated an easily implemented informational 
debiasing strategy offering little disruption to an individual’s daily routine. The debiasing had no 
effect on anchoring, but further investigation with a larger sample size and higher external 
validity is necessary before discounting the strategy completely.   
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Come On Down: Investigating an Informational Strategy to Debias the Anchoring Heuristic 
Individuals make hundreds if not thousands of decisions daily. For example, the author of 
this thesis ordered a caffeinated beverage this morning from a menu with hundreds of potential 
options – impressively, she accomplished this while simultaneously making a mental list of her 
tasks for the day. Though it may not appear that impressive to choose a skim latte with sugar-free 
vanilla and hazelnut syrup in three seconds, given the myriad combinations of beverages 
(Americano, Frappuccino, Red Eye, Thai, steamer, macchiato, chai, etc.), flavors (mocha, 
caramel, gingerbread, peppermint, etc.) and milk types (skim, 2%, and soy), she could not 
choose so efficiently and at the same time focus her mind on other matters if not for decision-
making short cuts. These short-cuts, known as heuristics, allow individuals to make rapid, mostly 
unconscious decisions by ignoring certain aspects of the problem at hand in order to focus on 
other important aspects of the problem. For example, a customer in line for coffee may not stop 
to ponder every single choice on the menu (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  
Individuals use heuristics to make decisions on purchases from mochas to mansions, and 
even though they are short cuts, and therefore may at first blush appear suboptimal, heuristics 
can often provide more satisfactory solutions than careful deliberation or weighing the options 
(Gigerenzer, 2008).  For instance, heuristics may result in a willingness to pay higher prices for 
coffee if the store’s décor appears expensive and sophisticated due to an assumption that the 
drink in a fancy coffee shop is worth more than a drink from the local donut shop (Ariely, 2009). 
It is perfectly reasonable that heuristics may lead to accurate conclusion that better décor reveals 
a greater focus on quality and therefore higher worth of coffee; this heuristic thus may in fact 
lead people to make more optimal choices. However, heuristics can sometimes lead us astray; for 
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example, it is possible that the fancy coffee shop sells the same brand of coffee as the local donut 
shop, and merely spends more money on better décor.  
Therefore, heuristics can often be useful, but they are not always preferable to careful 
consideration, especially when irrelevant information influences heuristics, leading to less-than-
ideal decisions (Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010). For instance, a decision to pay a higher 
price for the same cup of coffee at the fancier store may result in small losses that build up over 
time. Spending five extra dollars per week on coffee adds up to spending an additional $260 
dollars more for the same coffee per year, or close to $10,000 over a lifetime. Though even this 
may not seem like a huge loss, the impact of heuristics is much broader than coffee; they impact 
day-to-day behaviors such as shopping at the grocery store, and expensive investment decisions 
including purchasing real estate or shares in the stock market alike (Lambson, McQueen, & 
Slade, 2004; Kaustia, Alho, Puttonen, 2008).  
Therefore, to try to help people avoid the impact of these heuristics, scientists began 
exploring ways to debias, or greatly reduce, the negative effects of heuristics. Although the 
effects of debiasing could be quite far reaching, debiasing itself provides numerous challenges. 
Most notably, debiasing often does not work: most interventions fail to allow people to 
generalize to the world outside the lab where heuristics affect decision-making and result in real 
and profound mistakes (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; George, Duffy, 
& Ahuja, 2000).  
Here we will investigate an informational intervention that could potentially benefit 
individuals making real world purchasing decisions. First, we will discuss three heuristics that 
lead to suboptimal purchasing decisions, with special attention on the anchoring heuristic, the 
primary focus of this research. Following a discussion of the cognitive process underlying the 
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anchoring heuristic, we will document anchoring’s negative effects in daily financial decisions. 
Lastly, we will discuss past debiasing techniques and describe the current study that builds on 
past research. 
Heuristics and Financial Decisions 
As we have seen, decision-making heuristics can lead to costly financial errors (Milkman, 
Chugh, Bazerman, 2009).  Specifically, three heuristics affecting financial decisions include 
representativeness, effort, and anchoring. The representativeness heuristic allows individuals to 
sort objects and people into categories based on the object or person’s attributes (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). For example, if people hear that Tim owns a great deal of land, likes nature, 
and enjoys taking his children to 4H shows, the representativeness heuristic would prompt 
individuals to assume that Tim is more likely a farmer than an auto-industry engineer, as Tim’s 
characteristics are more representative of farmers than auto-industry engineers. 
The representativeness heuristic also operates during purchasing decisions. Consumers 
are more likely to purchase products and brands that are more representative of a product 
category than those that are less representative. For example, if Linda decides she wants to 
purchase a cola, she is more likely to purchase a Coke than an RC or store generic, for most 
individuals agree that Coke is the prototypical example of a cola (Nedungadi & Hutchinson, 
1985). Individuals will pay on average 70 cents more for a Coke versus an RC or other cola 
brand name (Netemeyer et al., 2004). However, individuals cannot reliably discriminate between 
Coke and RC in blind taste tests (Bowles & Pronko, 1948). The amount of advertising, and 
therefore the awareness of a product, predicts brand preference and purchasing behaviors, and 
may be responsible for making a certain product prototypical in the minds of consumers (Cobb-
Walgren, Ruble, & Donthu, 1995). Individuals who wish to reduce negative effects of the 
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representativeness heuristic should gather trustworthy information about a product, as consumers 
make better decisions when they possess a degree of accurate information on a product (Keller & 
Staelin, 1987). However, they should avoid gathering too much information, as this can reduce a 
decision’s effectiveness by reducing a consumer’s confidence in a decision and increasing the 
cognitive costs of a decision (Keller & Staelin, 1987).  
Just as individuals will buy Coke over RC due to the representativeness heuristic, an 
individual’s valuation of a product can also depend on perceptions of its production time or 
supposed quality. This effort heuristic helps individuals decide an object’s worth or value based 
on how much effort and time they perceive went into creating an object. For example, 
participants price a poem they believe took only four hours to create significantly lower than the 
same poem if they believe it took eighteen hours to create (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & 
Altermatt, 2004).  
The effort heuristic can be useful in many daily purchases, such as choosing a book of 
poetry one knows took far longer to compose over another collection that took a shorter time to 
create. However, the effort heuristic can also result in suboptimal decisions. For instance, due to 
the effort heuristic, an individual may decide an aged wine is a better deal than a young wine, 
even though the young wine was produced by a vineyard that uses superior ingredients.  
Researching products before purchasing and understanding the quality of the materials, 
the rarity of the finished product, and even the reliability or desirability of its brand name may 
help reduce some negative effects of the effort heuristic by providing more information on which 
product truly required more effort (Keller & Staelin, 1987).  Once again, consumers should avoid 
gathering large amounts of information of dubious quality simply for information’s sake; 
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possessing too much information can reduce decision efficacy by increasing cognitive load and 
reducing confidence (Keller & Staelin, 1987).  
As discussed, individuals can reduce the negative effects of some heuristics involved in 
purchase decisions through a degree of pre-purchase research. However, possessing even expert 
pre-purchase knowledge on a product is insufficient to reduce the negative effects of the 
anchoring heuristic (Northcraft & Neale, 1987). When using the anchoring heuristic, individuals 
asked to estimate a numerical value use irrelevant numbers from their environments as a starting 
point for their estimate. These arbitrary numbers, known as anchors (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), can be telephone numbers, social security numbers, past prices paid for an object under 
different circumstances, or simply an arbitrary number written somewhere in one’s field of 
vision (Scott & Lizieri, 2012; Lambson et al., 2004; Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). From this anchor, individuals estimating prices subconsciously 
adjust their estimates, increasing or decreasing their estimates until they are satisfied their 
estimates are close enough to the target value. For instance, if Sue anchored to the number 72 
and had to estimate the price of a coffee gift package, she would start at 72 and add or subtract 
until she concluded her estimate of $55 was close enough to the price of the product. However, 
the final estimates of anchored individuals like Sue are generally too close to the original 
anchors, and while the gift package actually costs $35, Sue may estimate it is worth $55 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Ariely et 
al., 2003).  
For example, in an especially creative study by Ariely and colleagues (2003), participants 
wrote the last two digits of their social security number (an irrelevant anchor) and then estimated 
whether the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) of a product was higher or lower than 
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the last two digits of their social security number before estimating the product’s MSRP 
themselves. Participants with higher social security digits (75-99) gave larger estimates than 
participants with lower digits (1-25) did; in other words, participants with higher anchors were 
willing to pay an average of three times more money for an object than participants with lower 
anchors. For instance, participants with the lowest anchors would pay $11.73 for a rare bottle of 
wine, while the participants with the highest anchors would pay $37.55 for the same rare bottle 
of wine (Ariely et al., 2003). Interestingly, when asked to predict whether their estimates were 
too high or too low, participants reported they adjusted their estimate too far from the anchor, 
even though their adjustments were in reality too close to the anchor (Simmons et al., 2010). For 
instance, an individual anchored to the number 100 asked to estimate the value of a travel 
thermos may believe his estimate of $45 is too low, while it is in reality $10 too high. An 
individual anchored to the number 5 may believe her estimate of $25 was too high, while she 
was in reality was $10 too low. Participants’ assumptions that they adjusted too far away from 
their anchor while they in fact did not adjust sufficiently demonstrates why anchoring can be so 
influential in the world outside the lab.  
Findings on the effects of the anchoring heuristic outside the lab are especially troubling. 
For example, anchoring-based promotions, such as offers that advertise eight frozen dinners for 
$12.50 instead of one frozen dinner for $1.25, anchor participants to the given quantity. 
Although consumers often have the opportunity to pay the same $1.25 price for a frozen dinner if 
bought individually, anchor-based promotions increase sales by 32%  (Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 
1998). Anchored individuals may purchase more product than they actually require, potentially 
resulting in wasted money on freezer burned or spoiled food. Further, house hunters often 
subconsciously base their estimated value of a property, and therefore their purchasing decision, 
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on peripheral information such as a telephone number or housing prices from their former city 
(Scott & Lizieri, 2012; Simonsohn & Loewenstein, 2006), potentially causing consumers to pay 
a higher price than necessary on a property. For example, an individual moving from the high 
prices of New York City may pay an inflated price on housing in Bloomington, IL, as he 
believes that the Bloomington property is low in comparison to the prices in New York City, 
when in reality, the price of the new property is far too high for the Bloomington market. An 
individual moving from Peoria, IL, on the other hand would not likely experience this anchored 
monetary loss, as her housing anchor would be similar to the prices in Bloomington.  
Alarmingly, even professional realtors, who should base their estimates entirely on 
relevant factors, exhibit anchoring effects when estimating the prices of properties (Northcraft & 
Neale, 1987). Realtors should know numerous relevant aspects to evaluate property prices on, 
and yet they still produce anchored estimates. Possessing extensive knowledge on how prices of 
a product are determined is insufficient to protect individuals from the negative effects of the 
anchoring heuristic; this only increases the need to debias anchoring.  Amateur and professional 
stock market investors alike can also make poor financial decisions due to anchoring. Investors’ 
expectations for monetary return on their investments often anchor to their initial investment, 
which may not be realistic depending on the type of investment (Kaustia et al., 2008). Investors 
grow frustrated with their returns if they are not what they expected due to anchoring, and they 
may sell or fail to sell at an inopportune time and lose a great deal of money.  
Even experts’ estimates can be suboptimal due to anchoring. However, many of the 
numbers around individuals are either too high or too low to have any relation to an estimation 
task. It seems common sense that if an anchor is implausible to a task, an individual may not use 
it as a starting point for an estimate. Unfortunately, even the most implausible anchors can result 
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in an anchoring effect – for example, participants continued to demonstrate anchoring effects 
even when the anchor was 72 standard deviations away from the mean estimate obtained in pilot 
testing (Mussweiler & Strack, 2001). An implausible anchor, such as the number 2554 during a 
coffee maker price estimation task, therefore could result in anchoring effects – in estimates of 
the coffee maker costing $60 instead of $30. Random numbers therefore affect decisions even if 
the anchors are irrelevant (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Luppe & de Angelo, 2010) and 
implausible to the task at hand (Mussweiler & Strack, 2001).   
Past Debiasing Strategies 
Because the anchoring heuristic has such staggering influence over purchasing behaviors 
and other financial decisions (Luppe & de Angelo, 2010), research has turned to exploring ways 
to reduce the negative influence of anchors on individuals’ price estimates (Chapman & Johnson, 
1994; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; George, Duffy, & Ahuja, 2000). The ideal debiasing strategy 
would allow individuals to recognize when anchoring affects them in the real world and then 
adjust their behavior accordingly to stop anchoring (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Individuals would 
then be able to develop more realistic estimates or purchase the number of items they actually 
need instead of allowing anchors to drive their decisions. This goal seems simple enough, but it 
has actually proven challenging (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Furlong, Santos, & Levy, in prep). We 
will demonstrate this by discussing three anchoring debiasing strategies and the reasons why 
each is not an ideal intervention.  
 One debiasing strategy provides participants with an anchor in a different semantic 
category than the target estimate value. For example, participants told the height of the 
Brandenburg Gate did not anchor to the height when asked to estimate the width of the 
Brandenburg Gate (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). While this strategy is effective, it is not 
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possible to control the knowledge categories of anchors in an individual’s environment. This 
strategy is therefore unlikely to broadly debias consumers’ anchoring behaviors outside the lab.  
A similar debiasing procedure asks participants to think critically about an anchor and 
requested them to identify why the anchor and the target estimate are dissimilar.  For instance, 
although participants usually anchor on rent of one apartment to estimate the rent of another, the 
effects of anchoring disappear when asked to point out the differences between two apartments 
(Chapman & Johnson, 1994). While this strategy, too, is effective at reducing the negative 
effects of anchoring in a laboratory setting, it is unclear how well consumers could integrate this 
strategy into their lives. In order to do so, participants would need to constantly identify ways in 
which the numbers in their environment are different from those they need to estimate, which 
would prove exhausting and tedious to average individuals.  
A third strategy that successfully reduces anchoring effects involves warning participants 
in real-time that they are anchoring. For example, participants see an anchor price onscreen and 
then estimate the price of a piece of real estate. If they estimate a price within $20,000 of their 
anchor, a message in the computer program informs them that they are anchoring. Although this 
strategy did help to eliminate anchoring in the laboratory, having an ‘anchoring warning system’ 
alert at all times in the real world would be implausible and tedious (George, Duffy, & Ahuja, 
2000). It would be nearly impossible to constantly give consumers feedback on their estimates, 
and therefore the blatant warning strategy would not debias anchoring outside the lab where 
consumers face real monetary losses due to the anchoring heuristic. 
These three anchoring debiasing strategies, while successful in the lab, simply would not 
be successful in debiasing outside the lab. Individuals cannot control the knowledge category of 
the anchors around them. Likewise, individuals are unlikely to use the cognitive resources 
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necessary to compare why an anchor is unlike a target product. Furthermore, having a constant 
anchoring warning in the real world is tedious and difficult. While these strategies are successful 
in the laboratory (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; George, Duffy, & 
Ahuja, 2000), they are not likely to be useful outside the lab, where the negative effects of the 
anchoring heuristic are most profound. However, developing a strategy that can be applied 
outside of the lab in daily life is not the only barrier to successfully debiasing the anchoring 
heuristic.  
Challenges to Successful Intervention 
As we have shown, a successful intervention for anchoring would need to be learned in 
the lab yet function properly outside the lab where consumers face real and possibly large 
monetary losses. This ability to apply information learned in the lab to real world situations is 
known as far transfer (Barnett & Ceci, 2002), and is it notoriously difficult to achieve (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; Furlong et al., in prep). Far transfer is difficult because it requires that 
participants (a) recognize structural similarities between the learning task and the real world 
situation (i.e. recognize anchoring in the real world when it occurs), (b) generalize across 
different contexts (i.e., learn about anchoring in the lab and recognize anchoring both at the 
supermarket and when purchasing a house), and (c) remember what they have learned across 
long time spans (i.e., continue to use their new knowledge well into the future; Gick & Holyoak, 
1980).      
Achieving far transfer is a lofty goal, and unfortunately, previous research suggests that 
such interventions may prove difficult, as individuals find it difficult to know when to use 
knowledge from informational debiasing strategies (Furlong et al., in prep). Interestingly, when 
participants are told to apply their new knowledge to a different task, they are willing and able to 
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do so. However, it is difficult for individuals to recognize on their own situations outside the lab 
in which an intervention is useful (Gick and Holyoak, 1980).  
Gick and Holyoak (1980) demonstrated the best example of this concept by telling 
participants a story about a military general who wanted to attack a fortress. All the paths to the 
fortress contained landmines triggered by weight; if the entire army attempted to approach the 
fortress by one path, their combined weight would set off the landmines. However, the general 
decided to divide his army evenly across all paths going to the fortress, ensuring that there was 
not enough weight on any one path to trigger the mines. After this story, Gick and Holyoak 
(1980) told their participants about a doctor who had a patient with an inoperable tumor. The 
tumor could be killed with lasers, but the strength of laser necessary to destroy the tumor would 
also destroy the healthy tissue around it. Half of their participants were encouraged to apply what 
they had learned from the story of the general, while the other half were not given such a prompt. 
Without prompting, participants seldom arrived at the solution on their own – that is, to target 
several lasers from different directions on the laser – while with prompting participants nearly all 
provided the solution (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Thus, far transfer is difficult because participants 
often fail to recognize the proper structural similarities across contexts without proper 
prompting.  
Due to the challenge of eliciting far transfer, we decided to investigate a new simple 
informational debiasing strategy that, unlike previous strategies to debias anchoring, could be 
easily applied outside of the lab where consumers require it. We chose to investigate an 
informational intervention strategy because it is the ideal debiasing agent; if proven successful, 
researchers could distribute the information to participants, who would then in turn recognize 
situations in their daily lives when the negative effects of anchoring may affect them. Individuals 
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in turn would then find the motivation to carefully consider their estimates, which may result in 
better decision-making (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). There is some reason to expect that a simple 
informational strategy – in which participants are explicitly told about the bias and warned 
against making it – might prove effective. After all, researchers would be far less likely to write 
and individuals would be far less likely to read about decision-making biases in books such as 
Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2009) if they did not expect learning about decision-making to 
improve their choices. The utility of informational interventions is supported by the literature; 
namely, participants explicitly taught about an suboptimal strategy in a gambling task avoided 
using that strategy after intervention, though they still frequently relied on it before intervention 
(Furlong, Santos & Levy, in prep). However, even here participants were not truly debiased, as 
they tended to over-apply their new knowledge to tasks that, though superficially similar, lacked 
structural similarity. In other words, participants applied a strategy to a situation that at first 
glance seemed fitting for the intervention strategy, but in fact was not a fitting situation, and one 
that suffered from the use of the strategy. These findings suggest that if given the right 
information, individuals may successfully apply some aspects of an intervention to a task and 
thus improve performance, though performance may not be perfect or may suffer in other areas.  
Given the simplicity of the anchoring heuristic, and its lack of superficial overlapping 
features with other biases, we have reason to hope that an informational strategy might work 
better for anchoring tasks than for gambling tasks.  Further, even if their debiasing strategy for 
anchoring is not perfect, the pervasiveness of anchoring effects in daily life necessitates an 
investigation of whether participants could apply an anchoring intervention when they 
understand what types of decisions could benefit from the intervention. Using an informational 
strategy like Furlong and colleagues (in prep) could allow us to easily distribute such an 
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intervention outside the lab environment to reduce the negative effects of the anchoring heuristic 
among the general population. We believe the simplicity of the informational strategy merits 
further investigation, which leads to the current study.  
The Present Study 
In the current study, participants completed an anchoring-based price estimation task 
similar to Ariely and colleagues’ (2003) before and after reading one of three written 
intervention (explicit, abstract, and control) passages. The intervention passages were excerpts 
from Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2009), a book targeted at educated lay audiences that uses 
anecdotes and studies conducted by Ariely and his colleagues to summarize the many heuristics 
and biases used in daily decision-making. It includes a passage describing Ariely and colleagues’ 
(2003) social security number anchoring study (explicit), a passage about how peripheral 
information in one’s environment such as décor may negatively affect one’s purchasing 
decisions (abstract), and many unrelated decision-making biases such as the expectancy bias 
(control), the tendency for individuals’ expectations to shape their experiences (Lee, Frederick, 
& Ariely, 2006; Ariely, 2009).   
We thus investigated the ability of participants to apply new knowledge of the negative 
effects of the anchoring heuristic, or knowledge that peripheral information can affect purchasing 
decisions, to an estimation task. We hypothesize that participants who receive an explicit 
explanation of the anchoring heuristic will demonstrate debiasing effects, while abstract and 
control participants will demonstrate negligible debiasing effects.  
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Methods 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 84 participants, ranging in age from 18 to 24 years of age (M = 
19.10, SD = 1.26) recruited from a small Midwestern university’s subject pool system in 
exchange for class credit in General Psychology. Participants were informed they had the chance 
to win one of ten prizes if their price estimates were more accurate than those of any other 
participant in the study. Informed consent was obtained before the participants commenced their 
questionnaires.  
Design & Procedures 
To investigate numerical anchoring effects, we conducted a 3 (intervention: explicit, 
abstract, or control) x 2 (anchor: low or high) between-subjects factorial design. The dependent 
variable was the degree of anchoring effects before and after intervention as demonstrated by the 
difference of participants’ estimates from the product’s MSRP.  
Participants were first given an explanation of the study and learned that if they provided 
the best estimates in the entire study, they could win one of ten products after the conclusion of 
the study. After giving informed consent, participants performed an initial 5-question pre-
intervention price estimation task to assess initial anchoring behavior. Each product to be 
estimated (pictured in Appendix A and B, with MSRPs in Appendix C) was on a separate page. 
The first item on each page of the questionnaire asked participants to provide their “participant 
identification number,” which the experimenter wrote prior to the study on the first page of each 
questionnaire. This participant ID number served as the anchoring manipulation - half of the 
participants received a high “participant identification number” (85 to 95), while the other half 
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received a low “participant identification number” (5 to 15). This anchoring technique was 
adapted from previous studies (Ariely et al., 2003).  
After providing the participant ID number (anchor), the next question asked whether 
participants believed the MSRP of the product was higher or lower than their participant ID 
number. Finally, the questionnaire asked participants to estimate the MSRP of the product. We 
provided two product questionnaires containing different products both with MSRPs totaling 
about $138 (Questionnaire A: $146.92; Questionnaire B: $130.4). We counterbalanced the 
presentation of the questionnaires to control for order effects.   
After answering their respective questionnaires, participants read one of three 
intervention passages (Appendix D) and then took part in a brief comprehension check (three 
multiple choice questions and a short summary of the passage). Participants who missed two or 
more true false questions were excluded from further analyses. None of these passages have been 
tested as interventions in a published study. Our passages were of roughly the same length 
(explicit: 630 words; abstract: 617 words; control: 625 words).  
The explicit passage discussed the Ariely et al. (2003) product MSRP estimation study, 
explaining how the researchers influenced their participants’ MSRP estimates using social 
security numbers, and why writing the number repeatedly affected their estimates (Ariely, 2009). 
We chose this passage to investigate whether receiving detailed and explicit information about 
the anchoring heuristic that used a procedure structurally similar to the current study could 
influence its effects in the next estimation task.  
The abstract passage did not explicitly discuss numerical anchoring or name the 
anchoring phenomena, but instead implicitly described anchoring using an example of how 
anchoring can lead people to migrate from a cheap coffee shop to a pricier shop. Specifically, it 
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described how prices at the cheaper coffee shop originally served as anchors, causing a shopper 
to refuse to pay a larger sum for a similar beverage. If, however, by chance, the individual enters 
an expensive coffee shop with a nicer atmosphere s/he may buy a pricier coffee, assuming 
anything sold in such a tastefully decorated space must be far better in quality and taste than the 
cheaper beverage from the individual’s usual plain shop (Ariely, 2009). We chose this passage to 
investigate whether participants could achieve far transfer and apply a story of one’s choices 
being influenced by peripheral information (i.e. the décor of the expensive coffee shop) to an 
estimation anchoring task in which they may be influenced by peripheral information (i.e. their 
participant ID numbers).   
The third passage, the control passage, was chosen for its structural similarity to the other 
intervention passages. We chose to include a control passage in order to have a measure for the 
anchoring heuristic variations, if any, between the two estimation tasks and to have a baseline to 
compare anchoring effects to when no intervention took place.  The control passage discussed 
the expectancy bias by demonstrating how an individual’s expectations can shape his or her 
perception of a new experience, and was not applicable to the current study (Lee et al., 2006). 
The control passage described a beer taste-test experiment by Lee and colleagues (2006) in 
which they found that when first informed that a type of beer was laced with vinegar, 
participants were less likely to prefer it over a commercial beer. However, participants who did 
not know of the vinegar beforehand preferred the vinegar-laced beverage. Because participants 
who were aware of the vinegar expected it to have an unappealing taste, they perceived it as 
having that unappealing taste, thus allowing prior information to color their perceptions, while 
participants unburdened with knowledge of the ingredients of the beer preferred it over the 
commercial beverage (Lee et al., 2006).  
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After intervention, participants were presented with more estimation questions. Just as in 
the pre-intervention task, the top of each page asked participants to write the same “participant 
identification number” that had been assigned in the pre-intervention portion of the study. After 
answering their second pricing questionnaire questions, participants were fully debriefed and 
dismissed.   
Measures 
Questionnaire A. Questionnaire A (see Appendix A for products and Appendix C for 
MSRPs) was adapted from Ariely and colleagues (2003). The average MSRP for each product in 
Questionnaire A was $29.38. In Ariely and colleagues’ (2003), the researchers asked participants 
to repeatedly write the last two figures of their social security numbers before estimating the 
MSRP of each of six objects (2003). In the current study, the researchers forwent the 
presentation of items in person in favor of a paper based-questionnaire presenting one color 
photograph per page of five estimation products as seen in Appendices A and B. The survey 
asked for participant ID number atop each page, whether the participant number was higher or 
lower than the MSRP of the product, and then a numerical estimate of the MSRP of the product. 
The MSRPs of the products can be found in Appendix C. 
Questionnaire B. Questionnaire B was identical to Questionnaire A with the exception 
of its five products (average MSRP was $26.08). The products can be found in Appendix B and 
their MSRPs can be found in Appendix C. 
Data Analysis 
To investigate anchoring effects, we transformed all participants’ estimates before and 
after intervention into difference scores by subtracting participant estimates from the MSRP of 
the product (MSRP – Estimate = Difference Score). For instance, if a participant estimated a $5 
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back scratcher was valued at $10, the respective data point was -5. We then obtained the average 
difference scores per condition for estimates before intervention and after intervention. In 
addition, to assess change after intervention, we subtracted the participants’ difference scores 
before intervention from their difference scores after intervention to investigate changes in 
anchoring behavior following intervention (Difference Score After Intervention – Difference 
Score Before = Change). A positive mean change indicated participants anchored less after 
intervention, while a negative mean change indicated participants anchored more after 
intervention. 
We counterbalanced the order of presentation of the products, so therefore we collapsed 
the data over questionnaire type, resulting in a 2 (anchor: low, high) X 3 (intervention type: 
explicit, abstract, or control) between-subjects Analysis of Variance. 
Results 
Six participants (2 in the explicit condition, 3 in the abstract condition, and 1 in the 
control) missed two or more of the three true false questions about their respective passage and 
were therefore excluded from the analyses. We excluded one participant (abstract condition) for 
not completing the task.  The final sample consisted of 77 undergraduate participants. See Table 
1 for a distribution of participants per condition. 
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Intervention Anchor Final Sample 
Per Condition 
Explicit 
Low 13 
High 14 
Abstract 
Low 12 
High 13 
Control 
Low 13 
High 12 
Table 1. Participants per condition. This table demonstrates how many  
participants were in each condition in the final sample. 
As a manipulation check, we first investigated whether participants anchored before 
intervention by comparing their difference scores to zero – a zero difference score would mean 
that participants’ estimates did not differ from the MSRP, whereas a positive (participants 
underestimated prices) or negative (participants overestimated prices) value would indicate 
anchoring. Low anchor (M = 3.58, SD = 10.81; t[37] = 2.04, p = 0.05, 95% CI [0.02, 7.12]) and 
high anchor participants’ difference scores (M = -14.28, SD = 20.48; t[38] = -4.35, p < 0.01, 95% 
CI [-20.92, -7.64]) both differed from zero prior to intervention.  A one-way ANOVA showed 
participants’ estimates prior to intervention differed on whether they received a low or high 
anchor (F[1,75] = 22.71, p < 0.01, p
2 = 0.34). Prior to intervention, high anchor participants’ 
estimates (M = -14.28, SD = 20.48) were on average 4 times further from the MSRP than low 
anchor participants’ estimates (M = 3.58, SD = 10.81).  
When averaging difference scores both before and after intervention, participants with 
high anchors (M = -14.01, SD = 18.73) estimated that products were 4.03 times more expensive 
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than participants with low anchors (M = 4.62, SD = 9.24). High anchor participants estimated 
values that were on average 3.03 times further from the products’ MSRPs than participants with 
low anchors. This difference between estimates given by low anchor participants and high 
anchor participants was significant (F[75] = 12.11, p < 0.01). 
To investigate whether intervention resulted in a change in anchoring, we ran a 2 (anchor 
type: low, high) X 3 (intervention type: explicit, abstract, control) ANOVA with change in 
anchoring as the dependent variable. There was no main effect of intervention type 
(F[2,76]=0.53, p = 0.59, p
2 = 0.02) or anchor (F [1,76] = .33, p = 0.57, p
2 = 0.01) on change in 
anchoring effects. There was no significant interaction between anchor and intervention type 
(F[2,76] = 0.13, p = 0.88, p
2 = 0.004). See Figure 1 for the change per intervention and 
direction towards or away zero anchoring effects.  
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Anchor 
 
Before 
Intervention 
 
After 
Intervention 
 
Change 
Value 
Towards or 
Away from 
Zero 
Anchoring 
 
Explicit 
Low 5.15  
(12.11) 
7.51 
(6.09) 
-2.36 
 (11.09) 
Away 
High -16.78 
(23.57) 
-14.48 
(18.35) 
-2.29 
 (13.59) 
Towards 
 
Abstract 
Low 4.55 
(6.69) 
7.65 
(5.15) 
-3.10 
 (5.10) 
Away 
High -19.12 
(22.66) 
-17.44 
(24.68) 
-1.68 
(20.62) 
Towards 
 
Control 
Low 1.10  
(12.74) 
2.01 
(13.68) 
-0.91 
 (7.67) 
Away 
High -6.11 
(11.13) 
-8.89 
(17.85) 
2.77 
 (11.18) 
Away 
Figure 1.  Mean anchoring before and after intervention with change and direction.  
A negative mean difference score indicates participants overestimated the value of the products; 
standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
Discussion 
 Over a lifetime, the influence of the anchoring heuristic may cost consumers hundreds if 
not thousands of dollars. Most interventions designed to reduce the negative effects of the 
anchoring heuristic (Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; George, Duffy, & 
Ahuja, 2000) would be difficult to apply outside the laboratory setting where consumers 
encounter the negative effects of the anchoring heuristic. It is essential to investigate easily 
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applied strategies to reduce the negative effects of anchoring outside the laboratory. The current 
study thus investigated the efficacy of reading easy to distribute passages. One of our 
interventions explicitly explained the anchoring heuristic and its effects, while the other 
explained how peripheral information can affect various daily purchase decisions in a more 
abstract sense. 
 We replicated Ariely et al.’s (2003) findings that participants with high anchors estimate 
product values several times (in our case, 4.03 times) higher than participants who receive low 
anchors. Estimating values four times higher than a different anchor group is not in and of itself 
the most groundbreaking finding. However, we found that high anchor participants gave 
estimates three times further away from the MSRP of the product than low anchor participants. 
An inclination to underestimate a product’s value by $4.62 when anchored to a low number 
would most likely not result in many negative consequences. However, a tendency when 
anchored to a high number to estimate that a product is worth around $14.01 more than its actual 
value could easily result in a compilation of considerable monetary loss over time. The 
difference between the anchoring effects of low and high anchors found in this study may be 
because the average MSRP in the study was $27.73, and the low anchors (5 - 15) were closer in 
magnitude to this average MSRP than the high anchors (85 – 95). Low anchor participants thus 
had less need to adjust their anchors. Further research to determine whether replication of this 
pattern is possible when high and low anchors are equidistant from the mean MSRP is essential.  
 However, our intervention passages did not affect anchoring as we expected. While we 
predicted that participants in the explicit intervention condition would exhibit the greatest 
absolute change in anchoring effects after intervention, followed by the abstract intervention 
condition, neither intervention passage had any significant effect on participant estimates.  
DEBIASING ANCHORING  25 
Though we failed to reject the null hypothesis, these data are valuable. One interpretation 
is that the anchoring heuristic is so automatic that reducing its negative effects both inside and 
outside the laboratory will require strategies more complex than merely teaching participants 
about the anchoring heuristic. These findings therefore support a growing body of literature that 
suggests that debiasing heuristics requires extensive mental concentration beyond rote learning. 
Research by Furlong, Santos, and Levy (2012) on an informational debiasing strategy found that 
participants shown math supporting a strategy to perform better did not perform better on the 
task following intervention. However, participants who did the math themselves improved 
performance on the task following intervention (Furlong et al., 2012). This suggests that highly 
involved strategies, such as performing calculations or otherwise participating firsthand an 
example of how cognitive heuristics can negatively affect individuals, may be necessary to 
reduce the negative effects of automatic cognitive processes. We will discuss an application of 
these findings to anchoring in the next section.  
Future Directions 
While research suggests that future intervention researchers should investigate more 
involved strategies to reduce heuristics’ negative effects (Furlong et al., 2012), the convenience 
and wide applications of a successful informational intervention warrant further investigation of 
such strategies before deciding they are truly without value. Future studies should incorporate 
this study’s strengths, such as controlling for order effects, average MSRP per questionnaire, and 
intervention passage length. They should also ensure no numbers save the desired anchor appear 
on participant surveys.  
The current study contained limitations that future procedures should avoid. Because of 
our small sample size, we did not have many participants per condition. Some of our 
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insignificant findings may be in part due to low power, and future studies would benefit from a 
far larger sample size. Furthermore, our explicit and abstract interventions, while pertinent, did 
not tell participants to apply the information they learned to the task. Research suggests 
participants would benefit from a hint or command to apply their new information to the task 
(Gick & Holyoak, 1980). Our investigations may successfully debias individuals if they know to 
apply the information within, so future investigation of these passages with an added sentence 
asking participants to apply the information to the post-intervention task may reduce anchoring 
effects.  
Successful debiasing may require participants to have higher involvement in their 
interventions (Furlong et al., 2012). Participants in a past study were more successful after 
intervention when they performed calculations that supported a better strategy for a gambling 
task as opposed to simply watching the calculations performed (Furlong et al., 2012). Involving 
participants in their informational intervention may strengthen an intervention’s debiasing 
effects. For instance, a future study could use the explicit intervention passage and afterwards 
either continue on to the estimation task or have participants play an anchoring game similar to 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) wheel study in which researchers asked participants to estimate 
values after spinning a wheel fixed to stop at either a high or low anchor. After participants 
complete their estimates, participants would learn the correct answers and see for themselves 
how far anchoring brought them from the correct answers. After seeing their mistakes, 
participants would participate in another estimation task to measure degree of anchoring. This 
involvement in an anchoring-based estimation game may raise participants’ motivation and 
perhaps ability to provide better answers on a later estimation task.  
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This study may also not address how an informational strategy would affect actual 
consumer willingness to pay decisions. Although our participants could receive a prize, the 
stakes of winning or not winning a prize may not be similar enough to losing actual money to 
investigate whether an informational strategy would be sufficient to reduce anchoring effects 
outside the laboratory. Potential losses tend to affect individuals’ decisions more strongly than 
potential gains, and thus consumers outside the lab may be more motivated when a loss is at 
stake than when the gain of a prize is at stake (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). One procedure that 
could address this would give participants money, anchor them, ask them to estimate the MSRP 
of a product, and then give them the opportunity to buy the same product at a fixed cost. One 
third of products would have fixed costs that are the actual MSRP of the product, one third 
would have fixed costs around $15 over the MSRPs, and one third would have fixed costs 
around $15 under the MSRPs. If a participant wished to buy a product for its fixed price, he 
could purchase it. If he believed it was overpriced, he could choose not to purchase the product 
and instead keep the money for a future purchase or to keep after the study. The added 
motivation of losing actual money may add to the external validity of investigations of 
informational interventions. 
Though there was no interaction between change in anchoring effects and anchor type 
following intervention, the average difference score pre-intervention for low anchor participants 
was just barely significantly different from zero anchoring effects and contained wide 95% 
confidence intervals. This suggests that low anchor participant estimates may not have been as 
strongly influenced by their anchors as high anchor participants, which may be due to the fact the 
average MSRP was closer to the low anchors than the high anchors. Future studies would benefit 
from using products with MSRPs equally from the low anchors as the high anchors. For instance, 
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a future study could use products with MSRPs ranging from $75 to $125 and use 50 as a low 
anchor and 150 as high anchor. This design would ensure that or perhaps even investigate 
whether low anchors create anchoring effects as strong as high anchors when both anchors are 
more or less equally plausible.  
One final limitation of this study was its inability to capture whether the pretest affected 
participant estimates, as all participants estimated product values before intervention. It is 
possible that participants anchored to their estimates prior to intervention, resulting in similar 
anchoring effects before and after intervention. A potential future direction to determine whether 
informational interventions truly have no effect would involve using a Solomon Four Group 
Design as pictured in Table 2 to test an informational intervention’s effect on anchoring 
(Solomon & Lessac, 1968).  
 
 Pre-Intervention 
Estimation Task 
Intervention Post-Intervention 
Estimation Task 
Group 1 Yes Yes Yes 
Group 2 No Yes Yes 
Group 3 Yes No Yes 
Group 4 No No Yes 
Table 2. Solomon Four Groups Design. A visual representation of the groups 
 in a Solomon Four Groups Design. 
 
In this design, Group 1 would estimate product values before and after receiving their 
intervention. Group 2 would not perform a pre-intervention estimation task, but would receive an 
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intervention and estimate prices after intervention. Group 3 would estimate product values twice 
but receive no intervention. Group 4 would only estimate product values once and receive no 
intervention.  This design would allow researchers to compare the anchoring effects of 
participants who did not estimate products before intervention to participants who did estimate 
products before intervention, thus ensuring that estimating product values before intervention did 
not negate any benefits of the intervention (Solomon & Lessac, 1968).  
Conclusion 
This study found no evidence that simple informational interventions can reduce or affect 
anchoring. However, because the procedure may not have captured the decisional processes 
consumers associate with potential loss, it does not necessarily provide evidence that a direct 
informational strategy would have no effect on anchoring outside the laboratory. Further 
investigation of informational strategies through procedures with larger sample sizes and higher 
external validity is necessary before discounting this potential intervention completely. 
Furthermore, the findings that high anchor participants would pay $14.01 more than a product’s 
value adds to the growing body of research suggesting that the potential monetary losses due to 
anchoring heuristic could easily build up over time. Further investigation of strategies to debias 
the anchoring heuristic and prevent financial loss are therefore essential.    
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Appendix A 
MSRP Questionnaire A 
Please Note: The numbers were not pictured on the original questionnaire. 
1) What is your participant ID number? ________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower than the 
MSRP of this coffee table book?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this coffee 
 table book. 
 Astounding nature photographs 
 Coffee table book 
 Jaw dropping photos 
 
2) What is your participant ID 
number? ________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant 
ID number higher or lower than 
the MSRP of this personal 
blender?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this 
personal blender. 
 Compact design ideal for 
small living spaces and on-
the-go portability 
 Great for making smoothies, shakes, baby formula, 
marinades and salad dressings 
 Blending jar also functions as portable travel cup that fits 
most car drink holders 
3) What is your participant ID number? ________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower than the 
MSRP of this back scratcher?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this back scratcher. 
 Comfortable cushion grip handle 
 Bear paw shaped metal claw.  
 Sure to provide itch relief in those hard to reach places   
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4) What is your participant ID number? 
________ 
a) Circle one: is your 
participant ID 
number higher or 
lower than the 
MSRP of this 
artificial tree?  
b) Please estimate the 
MSRP of this 
artificial tree. 
 Finally, a Bonsai tree that's easy to maintain. 
 Enhances décor and creates a peaceful and elegant 
atmosphere 
 Lives forever without the hassle of ever having to water, 
trim or maintain 
 
5) What is your participant ID number? ________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower than the 
MSRP of these headphones? 
b) Please estimate the MSRP of these headphones. 
 
 
 
 Lightweight and comfortable economical headphones 
 Features smooth silver design and leatherette ear pads 
 Delivers powerful, bass-driven sound 
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Appendix B 
MSRP Questionnaire B 
Note: The numbers did not appear in the original questionnaire.  
1) What is your participant ID number? ________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower than the MSRP of this multi-
function keychain tool?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this multi-function keychain tool. 
 
 With the utili-key, you can open bottles,  
  packages, letters, and most screws 
 Polished stainless steel finish 
 Multiple screwdrivers, including a flat  
  screwdriver, Phillips screwdriver, and micro- 
  sized screwdriver 
 
2) What is your participant ID number? ______ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower than 
 the MSRP of this LED flashlight? 
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this waterproof LED flashlight. 
$________ 
 Super mini size, bright, blinding effect 
 Skid-proof design & waterproof design. 
 AA batteries 
 
 
3) What is your participant ID number? 
________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number 
higher or lower than the MSRP of this tin 
sign?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this tin sign. 
 professional 
quality metal / 
tin sign 
 enameled paint is attractive and very durable 
 measures a foot by a foot and a half 
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4) What is your participant ID number? 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower 
than the MSRP of this filtered water bottle?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this filtered water bottle. 
 All natural filter made from coconut shell 
 Leak resistant lid with built in straw 
 BPA free and FDA compliant materials used throughout 
 
5) What is your participant ID number? ________ 
a) Circle one: is your participant ID number higher or lower 
than the MSRP of this portable speaker?  
b) Please estimate the MSRP of this portable speaker.  
 
 Ultra-portable and light weight design  
 Built-in High Capacity rechargeable 
    built-in lithium battery.  
 Bluetooth Version  with Built-in 
    Microphone + DER for high fidelity  
   audio transmission 
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Appendix C 
Product Prices 
Product MSRP 
Bear Claw Back Scratcher  $5  
Utili-key Multi-function Tool  $10  
Smart Planet Water Bottle  $15  
Personal Blender  $21.99  
Coffee Tin Sign  $25  
Sennheiser HD201 Headphones  $29.99  
Waterproof LED Flashlight Torch 8 $35.40  
Planet Earth: As You've Never Seen It Before  $39.95  
Bluetooth Speaker $45 
Artificial Bonsai Tree  $49.99  
 
Table 3. Product MSRPs. This table lists the MSRPs of each product used in the study.    
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Appendix D 
Intervention Anchoring Passages 
 
Explicit Passage 
“A few decades ago, the naturalist Konrad Lorenz discovered that goslings, upon 
breaking out of their eggs, become attached to the first moving object they encounter 
(which is generally their mother). Lorenz knew this because in one experiment he became 
the first thing they saw, and they followed him loyally from then on through adolescence. 
With that, Lorenz demonstrated not only that goslings make initial decisions based on 
what's available in their environment, but that they stick with a decision once it has been 
made. Lorenz called this natural phenomenon imprinting. 
Is the human brain, then, wired like that of a gosling? Do our first impressions 
and decisions become imprinted? And if so, how does this imprinting play out our lives? 
When we encounter a new product, for instance, do we accept the first price that comes 
before our eyes? And more importantly, does that price (which in academic lingo we call 
an anchor) have a long-term effect on our willingness to pay for the product from then 
on? 
…"Now here we have a nice Cotes du Rhone Jaboulet Parallel," said Drazen 
Prelec, a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management.....At the time, sitting before 
him were the 55 students ... We … ask[ed] them to jot down the last two digits of their 
social security numbers and tell us whether they would pay this amount for a number of 
products, including the bottle of wine. Then, we would ask them to actually bid on these 
items in an auction. 
What were we trying to prove? The existence of what we called arbitrary 
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coherence. The basic idea of arbitrary coherence is this: although initial prices are 
arbitrary, once those prices are established in our minds they will shape not only present 
prices but also future prices. So, would thinking about one's social security number be 
enough to create an anchor? And would that initial anchor have a long-term influence? 
That's what we wanted to see. 
... In turn, Drazen held up four other items: a cordless trackball, a cordless 
keyboard and mouse, a design book, and a one-pound box of Belgian chocolates. ..."Now 
I want you to write the last two digits of your social security number at the top of the 
page," he instructed. "And then write them again next to each of the items in the form of 
a price. In other words, if the last two digits are twenty-three, write twenty-three dollars. 
Now when you're finished with that, I want you to indicate on your sheets - with a simple 
yes or no - whether you would pay that amount for each of the products." 
When the students had finished answering yes or no to each item, Drazen asked 
them to write down the maximum amount they were willing to pay for each of the 
products (their bids).  
...The students with the highest-ending social security digits bid highest, while 
those with lowest-ending numbers bid lowest. …Social security numbers were the anchor 
in this experiment only because we requested them. We could have just as well asked for 
the current temperature or the MSRP. Any question, in fact, would have created the 
anchor. Does this seem rational? Of course not, but that's the way we are - goslings, after 
all.  
…In life we are bombarded by prices…But price tags by themselves are not 
necessarily anchors. They become anchors we contemplate buying a product or service at 
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a particular price. That’s when the imprint is set. From then on, we are willing to accept a 
range of prices – but as with the pull of a bungee cord, we always refer back to the 
original anchor. Thus the first anchor influences not only the immediate buying decision 
but many others that follow. … [Thus] anchoring influences all kinds of purchases.” 
From Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational 
QUIZ (You may look back at the passage)  
Circle One:  
True or False: Peripheral numbers unrelated to a task can affect our decisions  
True or False: The anchoring bias affects our daily decisions  
True or False: Random numbers in our environment can affect us in the long-term.   
In your own words, please summarize the above passage in 2-3 sentences. 
 
Abstract Passage 
“A few decades ago, the naturalist Konrad Lorenz discovered that goslings, upon 
breaking out of their eggs, become attached to the first moving object they encounter 
(which is generally their mother). Lorenz knew this because in one experiment he became 
the first thing they saw, and they followed him loyally from then on through adolescence. 
With that, Lorenz demonstrated not only that goslings make initial decisions based on 
what's available in their environment, but that they stick with a decision once it has been 
made. Lorenz called this natural phenomenon imprinting. 
Is the human brain, then, wired like that of a gosling? Do our first impressions 
and decisions become imprinted? And if so, how does this imprinting play out in our 
lives? When we encounter a new product, for instance, do we accept the first price that 
comes before our eyes? And more importantly, does that price (which in academic lingo 
we call an anchor) have a long-term effect on our willingness to pay for the product from 
then on? 
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Recall your first introduction to Starbucks, perhaps several years ago. (I assume 
that nearly everyone has had this experience, since Starbucks sits on every corner in 
America). You are sleepy and in desperate need of a liquid energy boost as you embark 
on an errand one afternoon. You glance through the windows at Starbucks and walk in. 
The prices of the coffee are a shock - you've been blissfully drinking the brew at Dunkin' 
Donuts for years. But since you have walked in and are now curious about what coffee at 
this price might taste like, you surprise yourself: you buy a small coffee, enjoy its taste 
and its effect on you, and walk out.  
The following week you walk by Starbucks again. Should you go in? The ideal 
decision-making process should take into account the quality of the coffee (Starbucks 
versus Dunkin' Donuts); the prices of the two places, and of course, the cost or value of 
walking a few more blocks to get to Dunkin' Donuts. This is a complex computation - so 
instead you resort to the simple approach: "I went to Starbucks before, and I enjoyed 
myself and the coffee, so this must be a good decision for me." So you walk in and get 
another small cup of coffee.  
...As the weeks pass, you enter again and again and every time, you feel more 
strongly that you are acting on the basis of your preferences. Buying coffee at Starbucks 
has become a habit for you. 
But the story doesn't end there. Now that you have gotten used to paying more for 
coffee, and have bumped yourself up onto a new curve of consumption, other changes 
also become simpler. Perhaps you will now move up from the small cup for $2.20 to the 
medium size for $3.50 or to the Venti for $4.15. Even though you don't know how you 
got into this price bracket in the first place, moving to a larger coffee at a relatively 
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greater price seems petty logical. So is a lateral move to other offerings at Starbucks: 
Caffe Americano, Caffe Misto, Macchiato, and Frappuccino, for instance. 
If you stopped to think about this, it would not be clear whether you should be 
spending all this money on coffee at Starbucks instead of getting cheaper coffee at 
Dunkin' Donuts or even free coffee at the office.  But you don't think about these trade-
offs anymore. You've already made this decision many times in the past, so you now 
assume that this is the way you want to spend your money. You've herded yourself - 
lining up behind your initial experience at Starbucks - and now you're part of the crowd.” 
 
From Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational  
QUIZ (You may look back at the passage)  
Circle One:  
True or False: Would someone who entered a fancy coffee shop be immediately willing  
to pay the higher price?  
True or False: Did the atmosphere of Starbucks influence this person’s decision to change  
coffee shops?  
True or False: Do you think one’s surroundings can affect judgments of quality?  
In your own words, please summarize the above passage in 2-3 sentences. 
Control Passage 
 
“You reach the entrance to Walker by climbing a set of broad steps between 
towering Greek columns. Once inside, you enter two rooms with carpeting that predates 
the advent of electric light, furniture to match, and a smell that has the unmistaken 
promise of alcohol, packs of peanuts, and good company. Welcome to the Muddy 
Charles - one of MITs two pubs, and the location for a set of studies that Leonard, Shane, 
and I would conduct over the following weeks. The purpose of our experiments would be 
to determine whether people's expectations influence their views of subsequent events, 
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more specifically, whether bar patrons' expectations for a certain kind of beer would 
shape their perception of its taste. 
One of the beers that would be served to the patrons of the Muddy Charles would 
be Budweiser. The second would be what we fondly called MIT Brew...Budweiser plus a 
"secret ingredient"  - two drops of balsamic vinegar for each ounce of beer.  
"Can I offer you two small, free samples of beer?"  
Without much hesitation, Jeffrey agreed, and Leonard led him over to a table that 
held two pitchers of the foamy stuff, one labeled A and the other B. Jeffrey sampled a 
mouthful of one of them, swishing around thoughtfully, and then sampled the other. 
"Which one would you like a large glass of?" Jeffrey chose beer B as the clear winner. 
...A few minutes later, Mina dropped in. This time, Leonard offered more info. 
Beer A, he explained, was a standard commercial beer, whereas B had been doctored 
with a few drops of balsamic vinegar. Mina wrinkled her nose at the vinegar-laced brew 
B and chose a free glass of Budweiser.  
...Mina and Jeffrey were only two of hundreds of students who participated in this 
experiment. But their reaction was typical: without foreknowledge about the vinegar, 
most of them chose the vinegary MIT Brew. But when they knew in advance that the 
MIT Brew had been laced with balsamic vinegar, their reaction was completely different. 
At the first taste of the adulterated suds, they wrinkled their noses and requested the 
standard beer instead. If you tell people up front that something might be distasteful, the 
odds are good that they will end up agreeing with you - not because their experience tells 
them so but because of expectations 
... Expectations enable us to make sense of a conversation in a noisy room, despite 
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the loss of a word here and there, and despite the fact that some of the words are 
scrambled. And although expectations can make us look foolish from time to time, they 
are also very powerful and useful. 
...The problem is that these same biased processes can influence how we 
experience other aspects of our world. These biased processes are in fact a major source 
of escalation in almost every conflict, whether Israeli-Palestinian, American-Iraqi, 
Serbian-Croatian, or Indian-Pakistani.  
In all these conflicts, individuals from both sides can read similar history books 
and even have the same facts taught to them, yet it is very unusual to find individuals 
who would agree about who started the conflict, who is to blame, who should make the 
next concession, etc. in such matters, our investment in our beliefs is much stronger than 
any affiliation to sports teams, and so we hold on to the beliefs tenaciously. Thus the 
likelihood of agreement about "the facts" becomes smaller and smaller as personal 
investment in the problem grows. This is clearly disturbing. We like to think that sitting 
at the same table together will help us hammer out our differences and that concessions 
will soon follow. But history has shown us that this is an unlikely outcome - and now we 
know the reason for this catastrophic failure.” 
 
From Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational 
QUIZ (You may look back at the passage)  
Circle One:   
True or False: Participants with no knowledge of the vinegar prefer MIT Brew. 
True or False: Participants with knowledge of the vinegar prefer MIT Brew  
True or False: Previous knowledge and expectations can change our perceptions. 
In your own words, please summarize the above passage in 2-3 sentences. 
 
